Based Camp | Simone & Malcolm Collins
Based Camp | Simone & Malcolm Collins
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What if we just... left the United Nations + NATO?
Today on Based Camp, we discuss the purpose, history, and utility of the UN and NATO. Do they make sense in the modern geopolitical landscape? Do they make sense in the face of demographic collapse? As people who constantly rail on bureaucratic bloat and mission creep, you might be able to guess where we fall… but what do you think? We’re keen to read your opinions in the comments. Show Notes A typical middle-income American household is paying $337.50 annually on the European theatre and NATO-related missions via their taxes * Per household, middle of the income distribution: USAFacts reports that in 2021, families in the middle 20% of the income distribution paid about 10,391 dollars per year in federal income tax alone. * So for a middle‑income household paying 10,391 dollars in federal income tax, a good ballpark is about 1,500 dollars of that going to national defense in a recent‑years sense. * And one mainstream estimate is that roughly 20–25 percent of total U.S. military spending is devoted to the European theater and NATO‑related missions (forces, bases, exercises, enablers, nuclear posture) * With U.S. military spending around 850–900 billion dollars per year in the mid‑2020s, that implies on the order of 170–225 billion dollars annually that can reasonably be tied to European and NATO deterrence, broadly defined * 1500*.225= $337.50 Meanwhile, what is NATO doing for us? I vote we not only leave NATO but also leave the UN (roughly $90-100 per year is paid to the UN per tax return / tax paying household—this includes lower-income households). Why NATO Was Created Basically to fight commies during the cold war * It emerged in the early Cold War as a direct response to the Soviet Union’s expansionist actions, including the domination of Central and Eastern Europe behind the “Iron Curtain.” * Western European nations were still recovering from World War II, and the U.S. and Canada sought to deter further Soviet aggression through collective strength rather than unilateral action. It operates within the UN Charter framework (explicitly referencing Article 51 on self-defense) but focuses on military readiness What Nato Does * Coordinate on defense, crisis management, and cooperative security * Like a neighborhood watch group * Participants voluntarily join * They coordinate on security and defensive action * They sometimes partner with non-members to promote stability beyond their own borders * They meet occasionally to strategize and troubleshoot Key functions: * Regular consultations in the North Atlantic Council (NATO’s main decision-making body). * Joint military planning, exercises, standardization of equipment/procedures, and integrated command structures. * Deployment of standing forces, rapid-reaction units, and multinational battlegroups (e.g., on the eastern flank). * Common-funded activities like infrastructure, command structures, and some operations (though the vast majority of capabilities come from national forces contributed by members). Article 5 (Collective Defence): An armed attack against one member in Europe or North America is considered an attack against all. Each member must assist the attacked party “forthwith… such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force,” in line with UN Charter Article 51 (individual/collective self-defence). The response is decided individually by each member but coordinated through NATO. It applies only to armed attacks (traditionally state-on-state, but clarified to potentially include significant cyber or hybrid attacks) in the defined North Atlantic area. * IMPORTANT: The Article 5 commitment (“attack on one is an attack on all”) is not a guarantee that NATO will always send combat troops; each ally chooses how to assist, which might be logistics, intelligence, or other support. What NATO Does NOT Do * Feature any concrete financial obligations in terms of contribution to group efforts * The treaty itself contains no specific spending requirements or percentages * spending targets are political commitments, not legally enforceable treaty obligations. * At the 2014 Wales Summit, members pledged to aim for 2% of GDP on defence (with at least 20% of that on major equipment/modernization). All members met or exceeded this by 2025 * BUT THIS HAS NOTHING TO DO WITH CONTRIBUTING TO THE GROUP * Updated 2025 commitment (The Hague Summit): Members (except Spain, which received an exemption) agreed to reach 5% of GDP annually by 2035 on “core defence requirements and defence- and security-related spending.” This breaks down to at least 3.5% on core NATO-defined defence expenditure (to meet capability targets) and up to 1.5% on broader areas like critical infrastructure protection, cyber defence, civil preparedness, resilience, innovation, and the defence industrial base. Allies must submit annual credible plans to show progress * Guarantee that members will host bases for each other * NATO cannot force a country to go to war or to host a base; participation in operations and basing arrangements is negotiated and voluntary. * Maintain its own large standing armies * NATO relies heavily on VOLUNTARY contributions from members * When NATO runs an operation, countries voluntarily “assign” units for that mission; those forces remain nationally owned and can be withdrawn by their governments. * Meaningfully enforce anything among members * The treaty commitments are binding, but failure to honor them (especially Article 5) only undermines the alliance’s credibility * enforcement relies on political consensus and mutual interest. * Any member can legally withdraw by giving notice under the North Atlantic Treaty; NATO cannot legally forbid a state from leaving. Examples of NATO members not contributing / helping out when asked Post-9/11 (Article 5 Invocation, 2001) * NATO invoked Article 5 for the first (and only) time after the U.S. terrorist attacks. Allies offered broad political solidarity, overflight rights, AWACS patrols over the U.S., and contributions to operations in Afghanistan. However, actual military involvement varied significantly: * Many allies deployed forces to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and Operation Enduring Freedom, but contributions differed in scale, duration, and risk. * Spain did not obtain parliamentary approval to send combat forces initially and provided more limited support (e.g., later ISAF troops and hospital units). * Other nations imposed national caveats (restrictions on troop use, such as geographic limits, prohibitions on offensive operations, or requirements for home-government approval before engaging). These fragmented command, reduced effectiveness, and increased risks for allies willing to fight in high-intensity areas (e.g., southern Afghanistan). Germany, for instance, restricted its troops mostly to quieter northern regions. 2003 Iraq Crisis (Turkey’s Article 4 Request) In early 2003, Turkey (which borders Iraq) asked NATO for defensive assistance—Patriot air‑defense missiles, AWACS, and other measures—because it feared retaliation if the U.S. invaded Iraq. * France, Germany, and Belgium blocked NATO planning for weeks, arguing that preparing defenses would signal that war was inevitable and undermine UN diplomacy, leaving Turkey feeling exposed and accusing allies of failing their obligations. This is one of the clearest cases of major members actively hindering support for an ally’s security request. Afghanistan Mission (Ongoing Caveats, 2000s–2010s) * Once NATO took on the ISAF mission in Afghanistan, some allies imposed strict “caveats” on their troops—limits on where and how they could fight—which meant that combat burdens fell heavily on a few countries (e.g., U.S., UK, Canada, the Netherlands) while others stayed in relatively safer roles. * These caveats were widely criticized within NATO as a way for governments to claim solidarity while avoiding the riskiest tasks their partners wanted help with. Recent Example: 2026 U.S.-Iran Conflict Following U.S. and Israeli actions against Iran (starting February 2026), which affected shipping in the Strait of Hormuz: * Several European NATO members, notably Spain, refused U.S. requests for basing rights, overflight, or naval support. Spain barred use of key bases like Naval Station Rota. * Others (e.g., France, Germany) offered limited or qualified support and declined direct involvement or a coordinated NATO naval effort to reopen the strait. This drew sharp U.S. criticism, with discussions of potential repercussions for non-supportive allies. These cases highlight how domestic politics, differing threat perceptions, legal requirements (e.g., parliamentary approval), and strategic disagreements can limit responses. NATO has no mechanism to expel or automatically punish members for such actions—decisions rely on consensus and political pressure. The US Disproportionately Helping NATO Countries Disproportionate US Spending in General In 2024, U.S. defense spending was about two‑thirds of the total defense spending of all NATO allies combined, meaning the U.S. spends roughly as much as everyone else in the alliance put together. The U.S. overwhelmingly dominates high‑end capabilities that NATO depends on: strategic airlift, aerial refueling, global intelligence/surveillance, precision strike, and much of the nuclear deterrent. In operations like Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Libya, U.S. forces supplied most of the enabling assets and often a large share of combat power, without which European allies could not have sustained the campaigns at the same tempo. Cold War and immediate post‑Cold War * Throughout the Cold War, the U.S. stationed large ground, air, and nuclear forces in Western Europe (West Germany, UK, Italy, etc.) specifically to deter an attack on NATO allies by the Soviet Union; these deployments are widely seen as the core of NATO’s collective defens
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