Based Camp | Simone & Malcolm Collins
Based Camp | Simone & Malcolm Collins
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US Colleges Caught Assisting Chinese Spies! (Giant Network Exposed)
Elsa Johnson, a Stanford student and Hoover Institution researcher, was aggressively targeted by a suspected Chinese Ministry of State Security operative. What started as a friendly Instagram DM from “Charles Chen” quickly turned into visa-free trip offers, pressure to move to WeChat, and eventual transnational repression — all while universities looked the other way. In this Based Camp episode, Malcolm and Simone Collins break down the full university-to-CCP pipeline: how massive Chinese student tuition payments create financial dependency, the role of CSSA (Chinese Students and Scholars Associations), Confucius Institutes, the United Front strategy, tech/IP theft in AI, and why American universities are failing to protect students and national security. Show Notes Elsa Johnson, a Stanford student, is calling attention to a toxic national security flaw playing out in American universities and the problem is so much bigger than I had imagined. This spring, she testified before the House committee on Education and the workforce, asking them to do something about the problem ‘I exposed China’s espionage tactics in The Times. Now I’m being harassed’ What Happened to Elsa Johnson? * Elsa attended a Chinese language immersion school from kindergarten through either grade in Minneapolis, Minnesota * Got into Stanford University * Became a research assistant at the Hoover Institution, where she focused on Chinese industry and military tactics * From her congressional testimony: * “In June 2024, a few days after I spoke with one of my supervisors at Hoover about Chinese recruitment tactics targeting American academics, a man calling himself Charles Chen reached out to me on Instagram. He had over 100 mutual followers with me and had photos of Stanford on his profile. I had no reason to believe he was anything other than a fellow student.” * “Over the following weeks, Chen’s messages grew more concerning. He told me he was from China and asked detailed questions about my research and background in Chinese. He offered to pay for a trip to China, sent me a flight itinerary from Los Angeles to Shanghai and sent screenshots of a bank wire to prove he could afford my accommodations once I got there. He also sent me a document outlining a policy that would allow me to travel to China without a visa. He sent me videos of Americans who had gotten rich and famous in China and insisted that I, too, could find wealth and fame in the PRC.” * “Later on, he began incessantly pressuring me to move our conversation to WeChat, a Chinese government-monitored messaging app. When I didn’t respond to Charles Chen fast enough, he would delete and resend his messages. He even referenced the whereabouts of Stanford students who were in China at the time of our correspondence. * “Then, in July, he publicly commented on one of my Instagram posts in Mandarin, asking me to delete the screenshots I had taken of our private conversation. I had not told anyone I had taken screenshots, and I do not know how he knew. The only explanation I could come up with was that my phone or my account had been compromised somehow.” * “I contacted two China experts at Stanford whom I trusted and they connected me with an FBI contact who handled CCP-related espionage cases at the university. I met with the FBI in September and handed over everything I had. The FBI confirmed that Charles Chen had no real affiliation with Stanford. He had likely posed as a student for years and used multiple fabricated social media profiles to target students researching China-related topics. I was told he was likely operating on behalf of China’s Ministry of State Security. I later found out that I was one of at least ten other female students targeted by Charles Chen since 2020. “ * She published an account of this experience in the Times of London * After that, she was followed and harassed by the CCP * “Last summer, while conducting research on China in Washington, DC, I began receiving regular phone calls from unknown US numbers. When I answered the calls in English, the callers would switch to Mandarin. In one case, the caller referenced my mother. These bizarre calls were intimidation attempts, designed to remind me that neither my family, nor I, is safe from transnational repression by the CCP.” * “Then, this past fall, the FBI informed me that I am being physically monitored on Stanford’s campus by agents of the Chinese Communist Party. They told me that my family is also at risk and is being monitored. As a 21-year-old who grew up loving the Chinese language and culture, I never imagined that studying it would put me in a position where a foreign intelligence service is tracking my movements on my own campus and monitoring my family. I fear for my safety and for my family’s safety.” The University Problem Universities Heavily Accepting Chinese National Students US Universities and Private Schools * Department of Homeland Security SEVIS analysis found that 47% of all foreign K–12 students in 2019 were from China Universities * Around one quarter of foreign (international) university students in the United States are from China. * The absolute number of Chinese students has fallen from a pre‑pandemic peak of around 370,000 in 2019 to under 280,000 in 2023–24, but China remains one of the top two sending countries (with India). UK Universities likely accepting more Chinese students to meet visa rules * To keep their sponsor licence, universities will soon need: 95% of enrolled students to actually start their course (up from 90%), 90% to complete (up from 85%), and a visa refusal rate under 5% (down from 10%). * Because these thresholds are strict and the start date is unclear, some universities have already effectively stopped recruiting from countries with lower visa grant/compliance rates, including Bangladesh, Ghana, Pakistan, Nepal, Sri Lanka and Nigeria, which currently fall below the new 95% benchmark in Home Office data. * Chinese students are good with visa compliance, so they’re likely to be accepted at greater rates * This will create greater financial dependence on foreign Chinese students The ‘Times of London discusses the problem in greater detail here. Chinese Students and Scholars Associations (CSSAs) * The CSSA the official organization for overseas Chinese students and scholars registered in most colleges and universities outside of the People’s Republic of China. * It’s described as a government-organized non-governmental organization * They were created by the CCP to monitor Chinese students and mobilize them against dissenting views, according to the U.S. State Department. * They receive guidance from the CCP through Chinese embassies and consulates, aligning their activities with Beijing’s political objectives rather than purely student interests. * They participate in the CCP’s “United Front” work, which Elsa in her testimony characterizes as using these groups as vehicles for surveillance and influence on campus. * In some cases, local Chinese consulates must approve CSSA presidential candidates, suggesting foreign government control over student leadership selections. * They may accept funding from Chinese embassies that makes up a large share of their budgets (Elsa notes Foreign Policy reporting that Georgetown’s CSSA received roughly half its annual budget from the embassy), creating financial dependence tied to political influence. There are also Confucius Institutes at universities * Elsa testified: “A bipartisan Senate investigation found that 70 per cent of schools with a Confucius Institute [programmes which promote Chinese Language and Culture] that received more than $250,000 in a given year failed to report it properly.” What is being done about them? In her testimony, Elsa notes: “Congressman Tim Walberg has co-signed a letter to Secretary of State Marco Rubio, requesting that CSSAs be evaluated for designation as foreign missions under the Foreign Missions Act.” and calls it a step in the right direction. She also notes “Section 117 of the Higher Education Act requires postsecondary institutions to disclose foreign gifts or contracts totalling $250,000 or more, and the Department of Education recently approved a new foreign funding reporting portal that launched earlier this year.” “Transnational Repression” According to a 2024 Freedom House report, “International students, visiting scholars, and faculty in the United States are being targeted by foreign governments and their agents. Tactics of transnational repression on campuses include digital and physical surveillance, harassment, assault, threats, and coercion by proxy.” The report cites the CCP as the biggest threat, noting that: * Classroom discussions and campus events on topics like Hong Kong, Xinjiang, Tibet, or Chinese politics are monitored, with information relayed to Chinese diplomatic staff or officials via networks such as Chinese Students and Scholars Associations (CSSAs) and platforms like WeChat. * Students who organize or join protests (for example, White Paper/zero‑COVID vigils) report being filmed, shouted down, or physically intimidated by pro‑CCP students or CSSA affiliates, sometimes resulting in assaults at demonstrations. * Authorities in China contact or visit students’ family members back home to warn them about the student’s activism abroad, creating intense psychological pressure on the student to stop speaking out. [freedomhouse](https://freedomhouse.org/report/transnational-repression/2024/addressing-transnational-repression-campuses-united-states) * Pro‑CCP actors use social media and messaging apps to threaten, smear, or expose identifying information of critical students, contributing to a climate of fear and self‑censorship. * CSSAs, overseen by the CCP’s United Front Work Department and supported by Chinese diplomatic missions, monitor Chinese
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